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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 3, the Appellant is appealing a final order 
and/or judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Millard County, State of Utah, 
entered on or about June 22, 2009. Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the District Court erred in holding that the administrative agency's 
decision that Petitioner's property is a "structure" was not arbitrary and 
capricious; 
a. Standard of review: reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the 
decision of the trial Court. See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 
P.2d 704, 710 & n. 8 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
b. Citation to the record: the Trial Court did not hold a hearing in order to 
determine the merits of Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review, 
accordingly, there is no record to which Appellant may cite preservation 
of the issues. However, the issues outlined herein were presented in the 
Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review for the Trial Court's 
determination. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Petitioner is not entitled to 
present evidence that he is entitled to a variance; 
a. Standard of review: reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the 
decision of the trial Court. See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 
P.2d 704, 710 & n. 8 (Utah CtApp.1988). 
b. Citation to the record: the Trial Court did not hold a hearing in order to 
determine the merits of Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review, 
accordingly, there is no record to which Appellant may cite preservation 
of the issues. However, the issues outlined herein were presented in the 
Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review for the Trial Court's 
determination. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Petitioner was not improperly 
denied meaningful opportunity to introduce evidence to the District Court 
regarding his request for a variance; 
a. Standard of review: reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the 
decision of the trial Court. See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 
P.2d 704, 710 & n. 8 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
b. Citation to the record: the Trial Court did not hold a hearing in order to 
determine the merits of Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review, 
accordingly, there is no record to which Appellant may cite preservation 
of the issues. However, the issues outlined herein were presented in the 
Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review for the Trial Court's 
determination. 
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4. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Petitioner was not deprived of 
property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution of the 
United State of America. 
a. Standard of review: reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the 
decision of the trial Court. See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 
P.2d 704, 710 & n. 8 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
b. Citation to the record: the Trial Court did not hold a hearing in order 
to determine the merits of Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review, 
accordingly, there is no record to which Appellant may cite preservation 
of the issues. However, the issues outlined herein were presented in the 
Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review for the Trial Court's 
determination. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Thad Stevens, the Appellant in this case, ("Appellant"), installed a metal covering 
over his driveway located at 40 South 100 East, Fillmore City, Millard County, State of 
Utah. On or about April 16, 2008, Appellant was served with a "Notice of Violation of 
Fillmore City Zoning Ordinance," by the Building Inspector for Fillmore City indicating 
that the Petitioner's covering violated Fillmore City Municipal Code 6-7-8.3 because the 
covering was not set back 25 feet from the front property line. 
Fillmore City Municipal Code 6-2 defines a structure as "anything constructed, the 
use of which requires a fixed location on or in the ground or attached to something 
Iii i\ \\w .i lived I*H, limn on iilie j.!iomul <uul u IIILII imposes an impervious material on or 
above the iirountl ' Stw tnUmihun 
Relying on Fillmore (*u\ Municipal Code 6-2, Appellant sought review of the notice 
n{
" lolation, which i. Khuiicd that the covering was installed in violation of Fillmore City 
i iH 'd i i i i i ines I In" 1 i l l inium t ' i l \ l !o« l in ln l \\\\\ Im ill hca id "\p|H ILl i l l •< appeal u i l 
or about July 31, 2008, and concluded that the metal covering was a structure as defined 
in Fillmore City Municipal Code 6-2. findinL* that the covering was both 1) fixed on or in 
the grc in II id, oi attac 1: ie d to so- i - . . : . . • - : . . . : . : . ) imposes an 
impervious material on or above the ground. 
At the July 31, 2008 hearing the Appellant conceded, and still i:• -nccdes, that the 
cov ei ii i,g is ii I fact fixed to tl le ground. However, Appellant disputed that the covering 
imposed an impervious material oi I oi abo^ 'e tl le gro . • .*: • 
introduce evidence establishing that the carport was nut impervious, however, the Board 
of Adjustments simply decided ilk \anance issue without allowing evidence. 
: [
 * icial 
Distric. uouru Miliaid Count), Slate of blah
 v ' 1 rial Uuuri /. ^p r ' l an t argued that i) 
the metal covering is not a structure; alternatively, that 2) .Appellant is entitled, to a 
11
 'ai iai ice ot si IOI Ud at I! sast b s alio i;v ed to pi es si it evidei ice tl lat 1 ie is ei ititled to a 
variance; 3) an ordinance that denies the Appellant the opportunity to present ev idei i.c: e 
that he is entitled to a variance violates due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
iiic iridl ^uun i • lia , tl iat: 
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supported by substantial evidence in the record, or that it was arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal; R. p. 66 
2) \ppellant failed to mak. a showing tiu.i despite the supporting lacls. and in light of 
c o n f l i i*-«* "• - -- >t 
supported by substantial evidence; R. p. 67 
3) Appellant was given sufficient opportunity to present evidence and argument at the 
Trial Court denied the Appellant's request for reconsideration of the decision. R. p. 
68^ 
Appellai it i IO i > * seeks appellate i: e vie \N . ie cover is a structure, 
that Petitioner is not entitled to a variance, or in the alternative H i . ; i> , 1 
to present evidence that he is entitled to a \ arianee. and ih.it an ordinance which prohibits 
Petitioner from presenting cv IUUK v ;nai establishes that he is entitled to a variance, 
asks that this Court remand the case to the Trial Court to allow the Appellant opportunity 
to present evidence demonstrating thai \p|K J ani shi-a d IM ilh-wcd a variance. 
SUMP nF/VROUM1^ 
Appellant installed a covering on his personal property to protect vehicles. Fillmore 
City ordered Appellant to remove the covering stating that it is a structure that is not 25ft 
I ii'iiii '" I'li'fn iltiiif'. li'iMHil pinpeih Inn imf N la I lioin I he side properix i lowever, 
Appellant's covering is not a structure as defined by Fillmore 1 \\\ « \ nk m\-;iuse il is IN »l 
irnpei s. 
I ;\enif!hisl . ,1" .ii'u; le find'li'fl \ppi ll,iiil\ IMMTIIII' r .I ",II IICIIIM1 IHKII" "'i 
applicable code, Appellant is entitled to a variance, or at least is entitled to the 
opportunity to present evidence which would establish that he is entitled to a variance. 
1 IK 1 in,il i I nil I Jul HI ml iillins Nppellniil In pirscnl n idiih v di.il lu h. \ nlillul lo a 
variance, and therefore the Appellant has been denied his "day in court." 
Appellant desired to present evidence to the Board of Adjustments that would ha\ c 
e stablisl led that 1 le is ei ititled to a v ai iai ice i n idei tl le Fillmore i ^ vtunicipai Code. 
1 low ev er, Appellant was not afforded a meaningful oppoi t • • ;:> so Fi in tl lei i: i 101 " 
Fillmore City Municipal Code 6-5-11 prohibits the Trial Court from taking evidence 
he record presented b> . . : \*{|u*iment See addendum. Such a 
setup alio r .
 ; i 
prohibit a reviewing court from making an independent determination ui the decision by 
essentially blindfolding tl le Court and forcing its focus exclusively on the evidence that 
Appellant of the procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend n , 
to the I Jnited States Constitution. 
AKUUMHNI 
Petitioner's Covering is not a "structure" 
Appellant installed a covering over his driveway seeking to protect the vehicles he 
•. vering from the weather and other naturai demem s. While the 
covering is in ' t> ' ftwd to (hr mound llir co\ irriny times mil I.ill w ilhin 11 it drUmliiH nlll \ 
9 
( in, MH, a m i is 111 u Inn itnl >il>|i i I In (In I ' l | i i " » i c ( i(\ nniiiu1 n n l i n a i i ' v V< 
addendum photos. 
Fillmore City Municipal Code Section 6-7-8.3 states that "accessory structures 
must be set back 25f t: fron 1 the front property line ann * ci iron* ihe MOC property line „ 
iiiili'ss ,ittachi:(i ;iirnl llinn ' il bun Is K fix;I liom llir sidi pmpirh limit ' Su ttthfentlttnt Hit* 
issue before this ( ourt is whether Appellant's covering is a structure, and therefore 
subject to the above referenced ordinance. 
which states that a structure is "anything constructed, the use of which requires a fixed 
location on or in the ground or attached to something having a fixed location on •> in the 
i»in i H 11111 ,HI il nihi l Hi i m p o s e s ,m n n p r n iiomi". iii.iiilccial mi o r a b o \ e t h e g r o u r . 
addendum. 
At the hearing before the Board of Adjustment the Petitioner conceded, and still 
concedes, ihai Appellant s covering fits within the first part of the definition <H .: 
structure in that it clearh is "atladial to sum tliitir Ln in: ;i liwii "nnjih, i ,, ,,, ||, 
ground ." h /. However, Appellant alleges that the covering does not fall \\ ithin the 
second part of the definition of a "structure" because the covering is not impervious. 
with approximately 2 lA feet between each 2 inch rod that supports the covering. See 
addendum photos, Webster's Dictionary defines impervious as "not allowing entrance or 
passage " *' Is is cl sai b ' dei i u • edby 1:1: ic attacl led p I lot :)s in: in 1:1 le addendum, just about 
anything can pass through the covering. Accordingly, the c • -\ n• n_ 
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fails tc f it \ villi ill it! me definitioi i of a"st n icti ii = ' '" as it is i lot ii i ipei v ions, 
present evidence to that effect 
Even it this Court should find that tlie covering is in fact a structure as defined by 
IE villi i ic i e 1"\ lunicipal Code 6- 2, the covering still does i lot v iolate I ' i l lmore Municipal v. --.le 
6-7-8.3 because \npe l l an t is entitled to a v ai iai ice Se fe i u Idei idum Filli :t lore N ii n licipal 
Code gives several criteria u« ^ h permit a variance to be granted where : 
1) Literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause an 
unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not necessary to carry out the 
general purpose of the zoning ordinance; 
2) There are special circumstances attached to the proper! \ llnil d< - nol 
generally apply to other properties in the same district; 
3) Granting the \ ariance is substantial to the enjoyment of a substantial 
property right observed by other property in the same district: 
4) The variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will not 
be contrary to the public interest; 
5) The spirit of the zoning ordin?> 
done. 
Fillmore (7/r Municipal Code §6-5-6. 
Appellant alleges that there is substantial evidence that will allow him to meet the 
grounds for a variance. 
It is anticipated that Fillmore Cih •=• '-1 irgue that the district court's review is 
reviewing the record of the Board of Adjustment hearing found that the Boai d of 
Adjustment's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. However, Fillmore 
Municipal Code (> • III '* K n I allows a ('our I: to take evidence when "evidence was 
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offered to the Board of Adjustment and the court determines that it was improperly 
excluded by the Board of Adjustment." See addendum. 
Here, the Appellant sought to introduce evidence to the Board of Adjustment 
concerning the issue of a variance; however, Appellant was denied such an opportunity. 
Beginning at line 392 of the transcript of the proceedings before the Board of 
Adjustments, Eric Larsen simply reads each of the criteria for a variance and then asks 
for a motion to pass or fail. R. p. 26. Each criteria is read in turn, and the members of the 
board motion and vote in turn on each criteria. The decision to deny the request for a 
variance had already been made. It was obvious that the Board was not interested in 
hearing any evidence. Appellant desired to present evidence, but no meaningful 
opportunity was given. Id. 
As such, the Trial Court may properly take evidence to determine whether the 
Petitioner should be granted a variance because "evidence was offered," but it was 
"improperly excluded by the Board of Adjustment." Id. There is presently no evidence 
before this Court of which the Court can make any meaningful review of the issue. 
Therefore, the Petitioner requests his "day in court," and accordingly asks that this case 
be remanded to the Trial Court ordering that the Appellant be granted the opportunity to 
present evidence establishing that he is entitled to a variance. 
An ordinance denying the Appellant the opportunity to present evidence violates 
Appellant's Due Process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 
Fillmore City Municipal code 6-5-11 states that: 
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"Any person adversely affected by any decision of the Board of Adjustment may 
petition the district court for a review of the decision. 
In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the Board of Adjustment's 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(a) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the Board of 
Adjustment's decision is final. 
(b) (i) The time under 3(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property 
owner files a request for arbitration of a constitution taking issue with the private 
property ombudsman under Utah Code Annotated 63-34-13 until 30 days after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the private property ombudsman issues a written statement under Utah 
Code Annotated 63-34-13(4)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an 
arbitrator." 
Emphasis added. 
Appellant, in his Petition for Judicial Review, stated the decision by Fillmore City 
decision violated his due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amended to the 
United States Constitution; in other words, "that the Board of Adjustment's decision 
was.. .illegal." Id. Though the Appellant was not specific in his Petition for Appeal, he 
was essentially alleging that the Board of Adjustment's decision was illegal because it 
amounted to a taking without just compensation. 
Historically, determinations of takings are mixed questions of fact and law. The 
United States Supreme Court, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 
1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) noted that whether government 
action has deprived a claimant of his property without just compensation is an 
"essentially [an] ad hoc, factual inquir[y]"). Id. at 1071. 
Fillmore City Municipal Code 6-5-11 (5)(a)(i) states that "if there is a record, the 
district court's review is limited to the record provided by the Board of Adjustment." See 
addendum. However, this provision of the code seems to be itself a violation of the 
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takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United State Constitution, made applicable 
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, if the Petitioner is not granted his procedural 
due process right to present evidence. 
Lest there be any confusion, the Appellant is not stating that Fillmore City's 
zoning ordinance itself constitutes a taking, for the Appellant realizes that zoning 
ordinances do not constitute a taking so long as they substantially advance legitimate 
state interests. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The 
Appellant is claiming, however, that an ordinance that prohibits the Appellant from 
presenting evidence to the Trial Court that would clearly establish that his covering does 
not impose impervious material, is a violation of his procedural due process rights, 
especially in a situation where the question is one that is "a mixed question of law and 
fact." Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 at 1071. 
Simply stated, the city of Fillmore, vis-a-vis its Board of Adjustment, has decided 
that the Appellant is not entitled to a variance. The Appellant seeks meaningful review of 
that decision in the Trial Court, but Fillmore City seeks to rely on a provision that limits 
this Court's ability to review evidence presented by the Appellant. As stated above, it is 
not the zoning ordinance itself that constitutes a taking, but rather the application of a 
procedural ordinance limiting reviewable evidence that violates that Appellant's 
procedural due process rights. Once the city has limited the Appellant's ability to present 
evidence, the city may then effectively take the Appellant's property without just 
compensation, resulting in the circumvention of the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United State of America. As such, this case should 
14 
be remanded to the Trial Court with instructions that the Appellant be afforded 
opportunity to present evidence that would entitle him to a variance. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant installed a structure that is not impervious, and therefore is not a 
structure under the applicable Fillmore City Municipal Code. The Board of Adjustment's 
determination that the covering is a structure is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
Alternatively, Appellant is entitled to a variance, but was not allowed meaningful 
opportunity to present evidence to establish his qualification for a variance. Furthermore, 
the procedure currently in place in Fillmore City Municipal Code allow the City to accept 
or exclude evidence as it deems fit, and then force the reviewing court to review their 
decision with a proverbial blindfold by prohibiting the reviewing court from taking 
evidence that would contradict its ruling. Such a system violates the essence of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court enter an Order that the covering is not a structure in that it is not impervious. 
Alternatively, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court enter an order remanding the 
case to the Trial Court to take evidence in order to determine whether a variance should 
be granted, and for any and all other relief deemed just and proper. 
DATED this \ V day of November, 2009. 
Ja\r&s KT. Slavens, Esq^  
Tate W. Bennett, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Addendum 
Fillmore City Municipal Code 6-7-8.3: 
Accessory structures must be set back 25 feet from the front property line and 3 
feet from the side property lines, unless attached and then set back 8 feet from the 
side property line. 
Fillmore City Municipal Code 6-5-11: 
Any person adversely affected by any decision of the Board of Adjustment may 
petition the district court for a review of the decision. In the petition, the plaintiff 
may only challenge that the Board of Adjustment's decision was arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal. 
Fillmore Municipal Code 6-5-1 l(5)(ii): 
The Court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the Board of 
Adjustment's record unless that evidence was offered to the Board of Adjustment 
and the court determines that it was improperly excluded by the Board of 
Adjustment. 
Fillmore City Municipal Code 6-2: 
Structure: Anything constructed, the use of which requires a fixed location on or 
in the ground, or attached to something have a fixed location on the ground and 
which imposes an impervious material on or above the ground; definition includes 
building. 
16 
Building: Any structure, whether temporary or permanent, having a roof, and used 
or built for the shelter or enclosure of persons, animals, possessions, or property of 
any kind. 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Attached hereto and as part of Addendum: 
1. Photos of Petitioner's covering 
2. Trial Court's "Ruling on Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review" 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
MIJLLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTA$g<j j jr 9
 2 g d ^ ' 
FiU*$ f^yte _ _ ^ | 
THAD STEVE JS, RULING ON PETITIONER'S PE IJTl ON 
FOR JUDICIAL REV II \^  
Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 08^70014: 
FILLMOEE CIf Y, Judge Donald Eyre, J r. 
Respondent. 
Pet tione Thad Stevens filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the Court or. A .%u: 21, 
2008 based on a learing held in front of the Fillmore City Board of Adjustment on July V;, )0£. 
Respondent Filli lore City filed a response on October 6,2008. The Court held i revi e\7 h *r ri j o. l 
April 13,2009, d ring which it instructed the parties to prepare memoranda on tl e tnai te ) 'e ± >ne r 
filed his me more lduraof law on April 28, andRespondent filed an opposing in more nu u i .m 4ay 
5, 2009. Potitioi er filed a reply memorandum in support of his petition on May 14,2* <D(. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This petr on stems from a dispute over a metal covering (also referred to by the i »a;ti s as 
a "carport" or "eg lopy") installed on Petitioner's driveway in Fillmore sometime prior to A] rill? 08. 
Petitioner appare itly installed the covering to protect his vehicle from adverse veath er cc idr: >ns 
The coverir g is s cured to the concrete ground and extends to a point less than 2 • feet fr< rn tl e one 
of the property li le. 
On or ab ut April 16, 2008, Petitioner was served notice by the Fillmore City 3uik ing 
Inspector indicat ng that the covering violated a Fillmore City zoning ordinance rtqunr;.. al 
structures en a r sidential property to be set back at least 25 feet from the Iront property ne 
Petitioner appeal d the decision before the Board of Adjustment ("the Board'5) A a heai in ; >r al) 
31, 2008, axguini that he was entitled to a variance. The Board, after some discission. d< n e the 
appeal and adjou tied the hearing. 
ISSUES AND LEGAL STANDARD 
Petitioner argues here that he is entitled to judicial review of the boards deci: k a * K en 
a disagreement v 1th the Board's interpretation of certain ordinance definitior > as -veil .it- £ lue 
process argiment 
The Court may review the Board's decision subject to the restraints foi nd in tl e 7i b >re 
Municipal C ode i s well as the Utah Code. 
The 7illm »re City Municipal Code § 6-5-11 states: 
Arty pei son adversely affected by any decision of the Board of Adjiistmtan may 
pe ition :he district court for a review of the decision. In the petition, the ph in ii? 
nuy onl r allege that the Board of Adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capric :o u , 
or iilegp . 
The review star dard is further elucidated by Utah Code Annotated § 10-9e~( 01, \/hot hta. s, m 
relevant part: 
(2) (a) / ay person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or 
in viola on of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review c It i«. 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land us-3 decision i 
fin al. 
(3) (a) T le courts shall: 
( ) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made undej the c ul ho i \ y 
c i this chapter is valid; and 
(i) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation Is 
a -bitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(b). i decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative 
disoretic i is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinaics, or 
regulatic i promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal 
<c) A inal decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if t le 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitral v. 
capriciox s, or illegal. 
(d) / determination of illegality requires a determination that t ie deci ;ic i 
ord inane ;, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the tioi; f .c-
decision vas made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
(7) (a) Tl e land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall tr insn it 
to the re\ ewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutos, fir d> tig >. 
orders, ai d, if available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings 
(b) If tl e proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape reccrciing Ls a i rue 
and com yt transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record 
provided oy the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(ii) 1 he court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record o: 'the 
lane use i uthority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was 
offered tc the land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the couit 
determine s that it was improperly excluded. 
ANALYSIS 
Petidonei first argues in his petition that the Board's decision was arbitrary OJ oap*k jut 
because the cove ing installed on his driveway was not a "structure" as defined by ths -ilh ore 
Municipal ("ode. 
Fillmore": Municipal Code 6-7-8.3 states: 
Accessor; structures must be set back 25 feet from the front property ltn J and 3 r^ c t 
from tin side property line, unless attached and then set back 8 feet from the si iv 
property line. 
The word :'stru< ture" is defined in the Municipal Code § 6-2 as follows: 
Anythin ; constructed, the use of which requires a fixed location on or in the ground. 
or ittacl 3d to something having a fixed location on the ground and which i;npos3s 
an impe: vious material on or above the ground; definition includes "Building " 
The word 'buik ing" is defined in the Municipal Code § 6-2 as: 
Any stru rture, whether temporary or permanent, having a roof, and used or tuik in 
the shell * or enclosure of persons, animals, possessions, or property of any kind. 
Petitioner oonte ids that the covering in his driveway meets neither the definition ol st notu e or 
building as four; 1 in the Municipal Code. 
Peiiticnc; correctly notes that the Municipal Code definitions of building and s n eti r, L pe< r 
to include the re peclive terms in their own definitions, which presents some o »nfus on. low ve *, 
the intent of the] Municipal Code's drafters can be discerned by focusing on the other iargiiie ithe 
definitions. 
ThoCou t first considers the definition ofthe word structure in the Municipal Code.-. C arly 
Petitioner's cove ring is something constructed which requires and is attached to a fb.ee: k s, ti I o i 
the ground and i aposes a material of some kind on or above the ground. The main Ih pi ie h )Vc r 
whether the mat -rial imposed is impervious. Petitioner claims, citing Webster's Eiciiomiry thc.t 
impervious- requ res something "not allowing entrance or passage." Since the covering iise-lt ioes 
allow passage ol a car or person through it, Petitioner argues that it is not impervious. 
The Boai i9 in its decision, focused not on whether the covering itself was iripenious bit 
whether it \ vascc mposed of an impervious material. During the July 31 hearing, board nerihei iri; 
Larsen saic: "W are not talking about impervious everything. We are talking about mipur ous 
material, and stet 1 is an impervious material Material used it can be made of swis^ cheese, i 'the 
material is impe vious, it would qualify as impervious, it doesn't matter how many ho es, pen 
windows, cr ope I doors you have, it is a structure by definition, as I read it, which :s :nsdi <•• t of 
impervious mate ial - and that could be wood, that could be glass, or that could be p sxk ass, 
plastic." (Trail! :ript of July 31,2008 Hearing ("Transcript"), Ins. 205-06,216-21.) At tin er 1 of 
the hearing, at P titioner's counsel's request, the Board voted unanimously that the cef iiitiu1 of 
structure in the h unicipal Code is "a permanent fixture attached to the ground made of irr- oon ous 
material." Tran cript, Ins. 485-93.) 
In review ng the decision ofthe Board on this point and all other points the Court t; ia no 
base its findings an whether or not it agrees with the Board's decision. The Court in £ .c:, ais 
initially "presum that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of ;hi; cha iter 
is valid." Utah C xle Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i). The Court may only decide the Boiird s dec! ior 
is not valid -fit is lot supported by substantial evidence in the record, or it was arbitrary, cap] Ic us 
or illegal. li. § 1 i-9a-801(3)(c). Substantial evidence is defined under Utah law as ' th s t [u a; urr 
and quality of n ievant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to suppc- t s 
conclusion.1' Fir. tNat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2*i 1163, !1 •'')* (I tab 
1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a district court may find a decision of a ] k a ol 
Adjustment arbit ary or capricious only if the decision was "so unreasonable" as to be la ode, as 
such. Xanthosv. doardofAdjustment ofSalt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032,1035 (1984). 'It dee, lot 
lie within ths prer )gative ofthe trial court to substitute its judgment for that ofthe Board whore the 
record disclose ; a reasonable basis for the Board's decision." Id. "Indeed, municiDcI a I nsv 
decisions as a A rhole are generally entitled to a 'great deal of deference.'" Bradley v. P,iy *.- C t\ 
Corp., 2003 UrJ 16, % 10, 70 P.3d 47 (internal citation omitted). 
Having eviewed the record and the transcript of the proceedings, the Court finds lie > tha1 
the Boards inte rpretation of the definition of a structure was reasonable, and therefore net iirb trary 
or capricious. 1 xere is likewise substantial evidence in the record to support theBoard'sc >i ci sion 
While Pet'tione • is correct that the entire covering is not impervious, the Municipal Code re uir^ 
only an imposit on of an impervious material As the Municipal Code does not firth er iefii e the 
term, the Board reached a reasonable conclusion that the covering imposed such e material >n ox 
above the grour i 
The Bos rd's finding might also be substantiated by the description found in the iufu iticn 
of the wor i bui] ling in the Municipal Code. Petitioner's driveway covering has a roo i a i< i used 
for the shelter o "possessions or property," i.e. his vehicle. Petitioner specifically exp reused i the 
July 31 hearing hat the purpose of the covering was to "protect his vehicles from i now rail arc! 
other things tha may do damage to his vehicle." (Transcript, Ins. 81-82.) Petitioner's; cov d r g 
therefore fits all the requirements of a building other than, arguably, whether or not it is a si .m cur s. 
Petition* r next argues that even if the covering fits the definition of sin et ir % e s 
nevertheless en itled to a variance. The requirements for a variance are set out ir I ivh 'oce 
Annotated § 1Q-&-702: 
(2) (a) T te appeal authority may grant a variance only if: 
( ) literal enforcement of the ordinance would cause an unreasonable hardship 
f >r the applicant that is not necessary to carry out the general pi irpos*; c.!' t ie 
1; nd use ordinances; 
( i) there are special circumstances attached to the properly that dc not 
ger eralb apply to other properties in the same zone; 
(i i) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substanti.il 
property ight possessed by other property in the same zone; 
(j /) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will not I e 
contrary o the public interest; and 
0 ) the spirit of the land use ordinance is observed and substantial justice 
done. 
See also Fiilmor : Municipal Code § 6-5-6. 
Again, tl 3 Court may only overturn the Board's denial of a variance if it fhds ih: the 
decision was so i nreasonable as to be arbitrary or capricious. In reviewing the transc:ip t o :*the luly 
31 hearing, the ( ourt finds that the Board considered each of the variance factors and reason iblv 
concluded ihat tl ey did not apply. 
The Boar I found at the hearing that the 25-foot ordinance was created lb r theu ht all x s eiy, 
and welfare of tte community." (Transcript, Ins. 251-52.) Allowing Petitioner scovei in i,t id:- arc! 
found, wou id not satisfy the first variance requirement, as Petitioner made no showing t ml it v • ulci 
impose an unreaj onable hardship that was not necessary to carry out this purpose. 
The Boar . also found that the second requirement of special circumstances was not sa dLs < ed 
Eric Larsen said i the hearing: "It has to be something unique about the property that zoning ha> 
is applied in that general area, the uniqueness of that piece or property has to be unique, one >f t 
kind/' (Transcri rt, Ins.. 273-75.) This finding is in harmony with the Utah Supreme Co. it's 
interpretation of he variance statute: "It is not enough to show that the property :;bi which the 
variance i;> reqi ested is different in some way from the property surrounding it. Each p;. ;e Ji 
property is uniq le. What must be shown by the applicant for the variance is tl at the pro] e 1 itsdl' 
contains some t Decial circumstance that relates to the hardship complained of and that
 :pi}' ing a 
variance to take ;his into account wouldnot substantially affect the zoning plan." Xcmhos ?. oara 
of Adjustment q'Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032,1036 (1984). 
Third, tl s Board found that granting the variance was not substantial to the m j :r me? of a 
substantial prop srty right observed by other property. Eric Larsen stated: "Well, if we grant; this 
structure to ren ain, a... violating the zoning ordinance, then we would have to o:en t p 10 
everybody, and re would come up with all kinds of impervious materials to deal with.' (Trans dpt, 
Ins. 282-85.) 
Fourth, i le Board found that the variance would be contrary to the public iatere >t gain 
quoting Eric Lai sen: "The twenty five foot setback is in the public interest, it\> one of those \\ ings 
that they have he d allowed zoning to continue because it affects the health, safety and welfare i. fthe 
community. Pr >perty values are affected when people start to encroach clear out to the p iblic 
sidewalk..?' (Tn nscript, ins. 288-92.) 
Finally, * le Board held that the fifth requirement did not apply. "[TJhe law says you ther 
knew or should tave known that there were zoning laws, it was published a long time ago an you 
can't... it makes it difficult when the City has to try to send a letter to everybody anticipating that 
they are going t( start building something because they never know." (Transcript, ins. 300-0= K) 
The Cov .1 finds that the Board had a reasonable basis for each of these decision- and 
explained its rea oning before voting unanimously on them to deny the variance. "[Ft i s i ie IT bent 
upon the party cl allenging the Board's findings or decision to marshal all of the evidence: i sir pert 
thereof and sho v that despite the supporting facts, and in light of conflicting oi c:n radi tory 
evidence, tie fie lings and decision are not supported by substantial evidence." ?aite\ \<cn v. Hah 
County Board oJ Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 n.7. The Court finds that Petitioner !ias i ai) d to 
make this showi ig. 
Fin illy, 1 etitioner argues that his due process rights were violated by liis inabili.y o pa ser t 
evidence at the J Jy 31 hearing. Petitioner argues that although he did not specifically s ate .so i his 
original Petition his position is that the Board's decision "was illegal because it amounted to a 
taking without j ist compensation." (Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition fo?: Jucl cisl 
Review ("Memc in Support"), at 6.) For the Board's decision to be considered illegal, Petit! mer 
must show that i "violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was n iade 
or the ordinance 3r regulation adopted." Utah Code Ann. § 10~9a~801(3)(d). 
Petitione claims that "the Petitioner sought to introduce evidence to the Board of Ad just r lent 
concerning the is me of a variance; however, Petitioner was denied any opportunity to dc sc .. It vva^  
obvious that the Board was not interested in hearing any evidence. Petitioner desire .11> MV *ent 
evidence, but no neaningful opportunity was given." (Memo in Support, at 5.) 
Due proc :ss at the administrative level requires only that a hearing be conducted at w deli 
an applicant is gi /en the opportunity to present evidence and argument. "What this includes i j an 
opportunity to pr .sent her cause, that is, her evidence and her contentions, to a tribunal VQ^C vitli 
authority to mak a determination thereon." Peatross v. Board of Commissioners, 5i 5 P. 2c4 28:= 
(Utah 1976). Sei also McGrew v. Industrial Comm % 85. P.2d 608 ("The "hearing' is lfo-> net; in*; 
of evidence and argument. If the one who determines the facts which underlie the order ha un-
considered evide ice or argument, it is manifest that the hearing has not been given.") (inte m . 
citation omitted). 
The Co irt, reviewing the transcript of the July 31 hearing, finds that due prose 3^  v s i c . 
violated: 1 hat P titioner was given sufficient opportunity to present evidence a id ari ui ne it d 1 tha i 
no evidence gi en was improperly excluded. Petitioner's counsel was giver, at t'ie )i t<e* >f the 
hearing, i sign Scant amount of time to explain his position, to present pictures o * P?Lt1 nei' 
covering and tl 3 property, and to discuss each of the variance requirements. (Trans* i] I I .23 
108.) In fact, nt ne of the board members said anything until Petitioner's counss ?1 requt ^  tz i f th^ 
ask questions. 'Transcript, In. 110). Further, after Eric Larsen explained the Board's rca mi i, 
concernin g Hr e ariance requirements, Petitioner' s counsel was given another c oport nr i t) to u >cu si 
his position and present additional argument and evidence in support of his reqi test. (Ti ar scri? , lx s 
329-386.) The Board voted on the variance only after all of these arguments we'3 nat anc 
Petitioner s evi* ence was presented. The transcript reveals no instance where Petit*o ieTb c mse, 
asked to presen more evidence and was denied. 
Because the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that evidence WT s impropt rl, txi udeci 
at the Jul} 31 h 'aring, "[t]he court may not accept or consider any evidence outside th 3 ret 3rd.5' 
Utah Code Ann § 10-9a-801(8)(a)(ii). Petitioner's request to present additional cv de ue ) the 
Couit is thereto e denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitiont r has failed to show that the Board of Adjustment's decisicn wa^ not h ^ J en 
substantial evidi nee in the record or was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. The Court thej ot u J nies 
Petitioner's reqi est for reconsideration of the decision. 
Signed this 2 j *Say of June, 2009. 
NDONAIJ) J. EYRE 
^""District qourt Judge 
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